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Abstract—In this paper, a new countermeasure against power 
and electromagnetic (EM) Side Channel Attacks (SCA) on 
FPGA implemented cryptographic algorithms is proposed. 
This structure mainly focuses on a critical vulnerability, Early 
Evaluation, also known as Early Propagation Effect (EPE), 
which exists in most conventional SCA-hardened DPL (Dual-
rail with Precharge Logic) solutions. The main merit of this 
proposal is that the EPE can be effectively prevented by using 
a synchronized non regular precharge network, which  
maintains identical routing between the original and mirror 
parts, where costs and design complexity compared with 
previous EPE-resistant countermeasures are reduced, while 
security level is not sacrificed. Another advantage for our 
Precharge Absorbed(PA) - DPL method is that its Dual-Core 
style (independent architecture for true and false parts) could 
be generated using partial reconfiguration. This helps to get a 
dynamic security protection with better energy planning. That 
means system only keeps the true part which fulfills the normal 
en/de-cryption task in low security level, and reconfigures the 
false parts once high security level is required. A relatively 
limited clock speed is a compromise, since signal propagation is 
restricted to a portion of the clock period. In this paper, we 
explain the principles of PA-DPL and provide the guidelines to 
design this structure. We experimentally validate our methods 
in a minimized AES co-processor on Xilinx Virtex-5 board 
using electromagnetic (EM) attacks.  
Keywords-FPGA;  SCA (side channel attack);  DPL (Dual-
rail Precharge Logic);  EPE (Early Propagation Effect);  LUT;  
Dual-Core;  AES-128 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the introduction by Paul Kocher et al[9], side 
channel attacks have been considered to be one of the most 
critical threats to the existing cryptography applications. 
These attacks get around the extremely time-consuming 
mathematic computation in conventional cryptanalysis, and 
directly analyze the physically observable leakages such as 
power consumption, radiation, timing and even sound. 
In this kind of attack, a proper analysis model which is 
used to predict the physical state of the cryptographic device 
is constructed. By this model, sensible data could be easily 
obtained by statistical comparison between the real measured 
data-dependent variations of these physical leakages  and the 
predicted possible variations.  
Another big threat from SCA is due to its furtiveness, 
since it passively gathers side channel information and 
therefore leaves very few, or no hint at all, to be detected. 
Therefore, active protection should always be on duty when 
the crypto-core is working. Nevertheless, increased energy 
and resource consumption are concerns, specially for crypto-
devices in resource restricted environments, such as WSN 
(Wireless Sensor Networks), or battery powered devices.  
Early Propagation Effect is firstly considered in [1]. The 
difference of arrival time for the inputs of complementary 
gates (or LUTs on FPGA) is potential of generating 
unintentional data-dependent power or EM peaks. 
In this paper, we propose a new SCA-hardened 
countermeasure which is free of EPE. We name it as PA-
DPL (Precharge Absorbed-DPL). The merit of our proposal 
is that it is free of most common drawbacks of EPE-resistant 
structure. In this proposal, both the precharge and EPE-
preventing logic are implemented into the LUT equations. 
As well, up to 4-input logic gates or functions are permitted 
with no gate type limitation. Meanwhile, identical routing for 
true (T) and false (F) rails can be maintained, which is never 
achieved by previous EPE-resistant countermeasures. In 
addition, it is possible to save power and area costs by 
implementing the countermeasures to the cryptographic 
module using partial reconfiguration.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents the related works of DPL solutions. In section III, 
we explain the rationale of early propagation and the light-
weight countermeasures. Section IV details principles of the 
proposed PA-DPL. Implementation of a simplified AES co-
processor and the experimental results are shown in section 
V. Finally, we give the conclusions in section VI. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
In SCA, interesting leakages come from the physical 
level rather than from higher level layer (logic algorithmic 
level). Accordingly, most countermeasures are deployed at 
low-level logic layers, i.e. gate level or layout level for 
reducing or concealing the leakages. Dual-rail precharge 
logic (DPL) is the typical studied logic protection method. 
It's experimentally proved to be an effective method towards 
power, EM and fault attacks. DPL aims to mask physical 
leakage by compensating the data-dependent power or EM 
variations. In this structure, a true and a false rail are 
generated to work in 'evaluation' and 'precharge' cycles 
periodically. In each evaluation period, the true rail generates 
true logic values, while the false rail generates the 
complementary values in each logic cell. The whole system, 
except the values stored in the memory elements, is forced to 
be in the precharge state (typically value '0') periodically. 
DPL mechanism ensures that each complementary gate pair 
 (compound gate) has one and only one switch in each clock 
cycle. This method effectively flattens the variations of side 
channel leakages. DPL is actually a rendezvous of various 
countermeasures. 
As a typical DPL, Wave Dynamic Differential Logic 
(WDDL)[3] avoids precharging every gate by propagating a 
wave of value '0'. So, a constrained gate library is needed to 
provide inverter-free gates. When applied to FPGA based 
implementations, a compound gate in WDDL cannot assure 
identical routing for the true and false parts, which inevitably 
leads to imbalanced side channel leakages[10]. To counter 
this, MDPL [4] combines the ideas of WDDL and bit-
masking to randomly swap the logic interconnect pairs by 
majority functions, so as to make the circuit insensitive to 
routing imbalance. Vulnerabilities of masking are revealed in 
[5][6]. By a so-called Power Density Function (PDF), 
analysis to a subset of the measurements could remove the 
masking[20]. DWDDL (Double WDDL)[15] compensates 
the imbalanced routing by using another WDDL module, but 
the resource cost is further doubled w.r.t. WDDL.  
Early Propagation Effect (EPE) is introduced in [1]. 
Authors of [2][7][8] prove that the difference of switching 
time between dual nets of either true or false parts is 
correlated to the data being processed. All techniques 
mentioned above suffer from EPE. Some skills are natively 
or intentionally proposed to resist EPE. Seclib [11] is 
immune of EPE, but can only be used in ASICs. DRSL[12] 
ensures synchronized arrival time before the evaluation 
phase, but not before the  precharge phase. STTL [13] 
introduces a third rail acting as the validation signal to 
synchronize the inputs. The unique STTL gates are 
customized which bring troubles to the implementation. An 
improved structure from MDPL[4], named iMDPL [14], 
resynchronize all the inputs by inserting SR-Latches. 
However, the complexity of basic gates is drastically 
increased.  
In [16], a logic structure called BCDL is presented which 
is capable of resisting EPE by synchronizing all the N pairs 
of inputs of a compound N-input gate and with no limitation 
to gate types. It has big decrease of area cost while extra area 
costs for synchronization logic are still needed. DPL-noEE in 
[17] avoids the use of synchronization signal by absorbing it 
into the encoding of LUT functions. In this new LUT 
encoding, LUT codes for potential intermediate states are 
modified to make the LUT free of unintentional switching. A 
pair of 2 input gates can be integrated into 1 4-input LUT 
and a pair of 3 input gates can be integrated into 1 6-input 
LUT. DPL-noEE, therefore, is absolutely free of EPE. 
However routing imbalance for both rails has not yet been 
solved.  
III. EARLY PROPAGATIONS AND LIGHT-WEIGHT 
SYNCHRONIZATIONS 
EPE vulnerability widely exists in conventional DPL 
structures. When gate switches either from precharge to 
evaluation phases or from evaluation to precharge phases, 
EPE potentially occurs in these switching actions. In this 
section, we detail the rationales of EPE and briefly show the 
existing light-weight solutions. 
A. Difference of Arrival Time 
Due to the different logic paths, the arrival times for the 
different inputs of a gate in ASICs or a LUT in FPGAs are 
various. A simple gate or LUT doesn't wait for all input 
values to be in the valid states before it evaluates the output. 
If the gate type and the combination of the input logic values 
are proper, an intermediate logic change, normally shown as 
a peak in power or EM radiation curve, would exist. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Data-dependent intermediate peak of a 2-input XOR gate. 
As shown in Figure 1, a 2-input XOR gate has arrival 
delays for inputs A1 and A2.  The arrival time for the 2 
inputs are ݐଶ and ݐଷ, respectively. At the start of 'evaluation' 
phase, only when the inputs combination is A1:A2='1:1', an 
intermediate peak in output F occurs. This peak starts when 
A1 arrives and ends when A2 arrives. Since it only occurs in 
proper combination of gate type and input values (Here, 
XOR gate and A1:A2='1:1'), we could say it's data-
dependent. Just by detecting this short peak, we may know 
what the XOR input values are. 
Additionally, just measuring the switching time is also 
possible to reveal the input value. This attack is based on 
switching timing delay [8]. In Figure 1, A1 arrives earlier 
than A2. If output F is evaluated to '1', an early switching 
action reveals that A1:A2='1:0'; conversely a late one reveals 
that A1:A2='0:1'. So, switching time is also data-dependent.  
In DPL logic, EPE vulnerabilities from different arrival 
time not only exist within each gate of the complementary 
gate pair, but also in the counterpart inputs between the gate 
pair. For example, if the routing lengths for a pair of 
counterpart inputs are not identical, a power or EM peak is 
possible as well. As illustrated in Figure 2, with different 
time delay, peak residues in power or EM curves exist.  
The  main reason for this delay is the imbalanced routing 
length of the mainstream DPL logic types on FPGA 
implementation, where gates are mapped to the LUTs and 
routing is strictly constrained. In each clock cycle, the 
register in the previous stage will propagate its memorized 
value to the register in the next stage. In the propagation 
through the combinational logic, time is spent mainly in 
routing wires, switch matrixes connecting each LUT and a 
small portion to LUT. In ASICs, routing can be properly 
controlled. In FPGAs, the internal structure of LUTs is a tree  
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Figure 2.  EPE related imbalance of side channel traces in DPL logic. 
of multiplexers[16][18]. So, no matter which value is chosen 
to be output in this configured RAM-LUT, delay time will be 
constant. That means, LUT delay is generally independent of 
the input values [19]. Only silicon process variation in the 
FPGA fabric can spread LUT delay, but if blocks are 
sufficiently near one to the other, this effect is minimized. 
Whereas, routing in FPGAs brings big challenges because it 
can only follow the limited routing resources predetermined 
by the FPGA structure. It's hard to make complementary 
routing identical. This introduces big difference in routing 
length, as shown in Figure 3. Consequently the balances of 
loading capacitances and arrival delays for the 
complementary signal pairs cannot be guaranteed  in FPGA 
implementations.  
To obtain a DPL structure which is robust against EPE 
both in precharge and evaluation phases, 2 principles must be 
followed: 
 
• Within either one of the complementary gates or LUTs, 
all the input signals should have the same arrival time, or 
should be synchronized by some mechanisms which 
make the output of gate or LUT switch only after all the 
inputs have obtained the valid values.  
• Between the inputs of the complementary signal pair, 
arrival time for them should be identical or should also be 
synchronized to switch only in valid states.   
  
FPGA gives not much freedom to adopt customized 
routing planning. Synthesis tools automatically decide where 
and how to connect the neighboring logic stages. Therefore, 
special schemes need to be used to eliminate EPE.  
B. Light-Weight EPE-Resistant Logic 
Cost for countering EPE in DPL is a critical issue. Seclib, 
STTL and iMDPL are injured by their big expenses on EPE-
resistant logic. In recent papers, two light-weight 
synchronization ways are proposed. One is BCDL which 
may integrate the synchronization part into the LUTs if limit 
the input number of the LUT equation to 2. Another one is 
DPL-noEE which eliminates the intermediate switches due 
to EPE by modifying the LUT encoding. EPE-free is 
achieved by modifying the LUT equation to a "monotonic 
increasing/decreasing function". Any possible intermediate 
change is avoided by encode it to '0' if precharge state is '0' 
or to '1' if precharge state is '1'.  
 
Actually, all EPE-resistant logic structure follow the two 
principles. If they can be obtained, EPE threat is eliminated. 
               
Figure 3.  Routing imbalance in FPGA environments. 
a) Evaluation phase starts only after the valid value of 
the slowest input arrives at the gate. 
b) The precharge phase starts before the invalid value 
of the fatest input arrives at the gate.  
IV. PA-DPL PRINCIPLE 
A. EPE-Free Synchronization 
In PA-DPL, precharge signal is reserved but absorbed 
into a free input of the LUT. Another signal, Ex, is used to 
act as a synchronization signal working together with 'Prch'. 
Prch here has doubled the frequency of Ex with a minor time 
difference advancing Prch, we name it ᇞ௧ . So they could 
produce a signal ܲݎ݄ܿ כ ܧ௫തതത which ensures a 25% duty cycle. 
The signal ܲݎ݄ܿ כ ܧ௫തതത is just the real precharge signal we use 
in PA-DPL, as the upper one in Figure 5. Here, one input of 
an i-input LUT is previously kept free to connect the 
precharge signal ܲݎ݄ܿ כ ܧ௫തതത.  
Figure 4 shows the signal's timing relationships of a PA-
DPL 2-input XOR gate when it switches between precharge 
phase and evaluation phase. In this example, let us suppose 
that input values of A1:A2 change from '1:1' to '1:0'. A1 
arrives the gate earlier than A2. Without Ex, when the inputs 
move from precharge state '0:0' to evaluation state '1:1', an 
intermediate transition peak, as shown in Figure 4, would 
occur. If the gate is precharged by ܲݎ݄ܿ כ ܧ௫തതത , the 
intermediate peak could be avoided since output would 
always be in the precharge state '0' unless ܲݎ݄ܿ כ ܧ௫തതത changes 
to '1'. This 25% duty cycle ensures that evaluation phase is 
always late, i.e. evaluation phase only starts after all input 
signals arrive at the valid states in a permitted frequency 
range. The minor time ahead of Ex also guarantees that 
evaluation would ends, i.e. precharge phase starts, before the 
fastest input arrives at precharge state '0'. This prevents the 
possible intermediate peak at the start of precharge phase. 
Furthermore, since the duty cycle of the precharge signal is 
always precisely 25%, i.e. the switching times of precharge 
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Figure 4.  Timing schedule of a 2-input PA-DPL XOR cell. 
and evaluation are fixed, the switching timing delay attack 
[8] previously explained could also be prevented.   
By this synchronization technique, inputs for either T 
gate or F gate is free of EPE both at the start of precharge 
and evaluation phases. However, if identical routing for T 
and F parts cannot be assured, the EPE threat still exists for 
the complementary signal pairs. Therefore, T and F parts 
should be kept separate in FPGA fabric in order to get the 
identical routing. This could be done by the "copy and paste" 
solution used in Divided WDDL [3]. All the information of 
the true module (including the instances, nets, connections of 
the original module) is copied and placed to a neighboring 
fabric (with high regularity) by changing the location 
parameters. Differing from the technique in [3], we just 
partially duplicate the module. This step is done by 
manipulating circuit's XDL description.  
B. Precharge-Absorbed Optimization 
In PA-DPL, synchronization logic is further absorbed 
into the LUT equations by using an extra LUT input. This 
optimization is shown in Figure 5. Since 2 of the LUT inputs 
are used as the inputs for the synchronized precharge logic, 
6-input LUT utilization for mission logic is equivalent to that 
of a 4-input LUT.   
 
PA-DPL efficiently solves the following major problems: 
 
• In PA-DPL, true and false parts of a compound gate are 
respectively separated into two parts which preserve 
precise identical routing for both parts. Due to this merit, 
the delay time and load capacitance for T and F parts are  
identical, with the only exception of silicon process 
variations within the FPGA fabric. 
• Gate type is not limited. It is permitted to use any logic 
gates, considering the LUT size, taking into account that 
two extra signals are required. 
• Masking[4][12][14]: Since the identical routing for both 
parts are achieved, masking, which is normally used to 
compensate the routing imbalance of the T and F 
networks is not required. 
  
Figure 5.  Absorbed synchronization precharge logic in LUT equation. 
• Logic complexity is reduced. The design flow can be 
automatic and requires less effort w.r.t. other solutions. 
C. Duty Cycle Enlargement 
Actually, the duty cycle of ܲݎ݄ܿ כ ܧ௫തതത is possibly to be set 
close to 50%. This can be done by using an Ex with less duty 
cycle, as shown in Figure 4, ܲݎ݄ܿ כ ܧ௫തതത can achieve a larger 
duty cycle. The time difference between the earliest and 
latest arrival signals is a constant value for a specific design 
even it works in different speeds. Therefore a larger duty 
cycle can be applied to a PA-DPL design if it works in low 
frequency. The expense is that more careful timing 
managements should be taken in order to ensure the rising 
edge of  ܲݎ݄ܿ כ ܧ௫തതത  will not lag behind the latest arrival 
signal. Normally, 25% duty cycle provides sufficient design 
margin and can be easier to be controlled. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND SECURITY EVALUATION 
A. Implementation on FPGA 
A minimized AES co-processor is chosen as the 
verification target. Figure 6 briefly explains the Dual-Core 
architecture style, where only the security-sensitive parts (the 
AES core parts) are protected, and other parts (control logic) 
are shared by true and false cores. This strategy is helpful in 
reducing costs (area and energy) in restricted embedded 
devices. AES-Sbox is implemented by logic elements instead 
of RAM. The control logic repeatedly runs the encryption of 
8-bit pseudo random inputs. A DCM (Digital Clock 
Manager) is used to generate the Ex from Prch meanwhile 
gives a constant time delay 'ᇞ௧ ' (by setting fine-grained 
phase shifting). Other timing delay logic could be used as 
well if the frequency drops out of the permitted frequency 
range of DCM. 
 
Figure 6.  Dual-core architecture of a minimized AES module. 
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Figure 7.  PA-DPL implementation of a minimized AES module. 
Implementation on Virtex-5 FPGA is presented in Figure 
7. The false module is deployed in a location very close to 
the true module. They share the same control logic and the 
synchronization precharge network. Virtex-5 FPGA series 
have LUTs with 5 or 6 inputs. Therefore, except the 2 inputs 
used for the synchronization precharge logic, the other 4 
could be used for any 4-input Boolean functions. Precharge 
network reaches every LUT. Hence, all cells can be 
precharged simultaneously. 
Experiments show that if we randomly choose a pair of 
signals from T and F modules respectively, they compensate 
with each other precisely following the principle of DPL, but 
differing for the 25% evaluation time during each clock 
cycle, as illustrated in Figure 8. Because the valid values can 
only take evaluation time to propagate to the next registers. 
A 25% evaluation time in PA-DPL inevitably requires a 
slower clock frequency to meet the timing requirement of the 
critical path. Nevertheless, PA-DPL has more freedom in 
logic optimization which helps to get a shorter critical path. 
Therefore, it effectively mitigates the timing pressure due to 
shorter evaluation time.  
 
Figure 8.  Complementary and precharged signal pair using PA-DPL. 
B. Security Evaluation and Attack Results 
An EM attack platform was set up to evaluate the 
security level of the PA-DPL against differential EM attacks. 
Similar attacks to a SE (Single Ended, i.e. Unprotected) one 
and a WDDL one are also done in order to make the 
comparisons. They are implemented in similar fabric 
position on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. We tested the circuit at 
frequencies from 844KHz to 33MHz. The maximum 
frequency reaches to 104.8MHz in timing analysis. EM 
traces are gathered by a self-made multi-turn copper antenna. 
Results show that the right key is differentiated from the 
wrong keys by analyzing merely 400 traces in the attack to 
 
 
Figure 9.  Experimental attacks to 3 implementations: 1) Single Ended; 2) 
WDDL; 3) PA-DPL. 
SE. WDDL resists attack until trace number reaches to 
43,600. Comparatively, the key has not yet been 
differentiated even we increase the analyzed traces to 
100,000, gaining an increase factor of robustness at least 250 
from SE one, and a factor at least 2.3 from generic WDDL. 
Correlation peaks are plotted in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 10.  LUT costs for different implementations on Virtex-5 FPGA. 
C. Cost Comparisons 
Compared with other FPGA implemented EPE-resistant 
DPL approaches, PA-DPL gives strong protections against 
EPE-related side channel threats meanwhile keeps minimum 
resource overheads. We give a comparison showing LUT 
occupations of our method and several other published 
solutions. Since there are 4 LUTs available in each Virtex-5 
SLICE, we can constraint 2 compound gates to one SLICE in 
WDDL implementation. For BCDL and DPL-noEE, results 
are estimated by counting the number of 2-input or 3-input 
gates synthesized from ASIC gate-limited library. For 
instance, in Synopsys Design Compiler, we use 
'set_dont_use' attribute to all the gates except the 2-input 
ones in BCDL estimation and 2/3-input ones in DPL-noEE 
estimation. The gate numbers from the 2 gate-level netlists 
are the numbers of LUT costs for BCDL and DPL-noEE 
estimations respectively. Comparison results show that in 
Virtex-5 environment, PA-DPL is the second best one in 
LUT occupation, only a little larger than DPL-noEE. And it 
has the best performance in avoiding imbalanced routing due 
to the routing identity between T and F cores.  
SE
WDDL
BCDL
DPL-noEE
PA-DPL 
216 
864 
610 
264 
286 
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0 50 100 150 200 250
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 50 100 150 200 250−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0 50 100 150 200 250−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0 800 1600 2400 3200 4000 4800
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Attack to WDDL Minimized AES Module 
Attack to PA-DPL Minimized AES Module 
Correlation 
peak for right 
key: 65 (Hex) 
Correlation peak for 
right key: 65 (Hex) 
Right key is not revealed 
Key revealed trace 
number: 400 
Key revealed trace 
number: 43,600  
Trace number 100,000: right 
key is not yet revealed 
True Signal 
False Signal 
CK 
Evaluation: 25% CK Precharge: 75% CK 
Ex
Prch
LUT1
LUT2
LUT3
LUT4Control Logic 
True Core
False Core
Attack to Single Ended ( i.e. Unprotected) Minimized AES Module 
  
TABLE I.  CHARACTERISTIC COMPARISONS OF DIFFERENT SCA-HARDENED TYPES IMPLEMENTED IN VIRTEX-5 FPGA ENVIRONMENT 
Countermeasure 
Types 
EPE free Routing 
Identical 
Precharge 
Networks 
Optimization Possibility EPE-Synchronization 
Logic Size  Prch Eval Gate type Maximal Permitted Gate Inputs 
SE * * * * free Free* * 
WDDL × × No Small Inverter Forbidden Free* * 
DRSL × √ No Small free 2 Large 
iMDPL √ √ No Medium Inverter Forbidden 2 Very Large 
BCDL √ √ No Large free Rendezvous is separate: free Medium Rendezvous is integrated: 2 
DPL-noEE √ √ No Small free 2 (in 4-input LUT) Small 3 (in 6-input LUT) 
PA-DPL √ √ Yes Large free 4 (in 6-input LUT) Small 
     * free* in "Maximal Gate Inputs" depends on specific devices. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, we presented a new SCA-hardened 
structure which aims to solve the vulnerabilities of EPE and 
imbalanced routings, meanwhile keeping smaller cost 
compared with other EPE-resistant DPL methods. This is 
summarized in Table I. High efficiency in resource costs 
benefits from the permission of using any gate type and as 
more as 4 inputs (for FPGA with 6-input LUT). Partial 
implementation of the countermeasure further helps to save 
the hardware and power costs. We implemented a minimized 
AES module by our countermeasure in Virtex-5 FPGA 
environment and made comparison attacks to unprotected 
and WDDL ones. Experimental results in our tests show that 
PA-DPL has increased robustness of at least a factor of 250 
from the unprotected one and a factor of 2.3 from WDDL, 
with a minimum area cost w.r.t. most previously published 
EPE-resistant countermeasures. Separate architecture for true 
and false parts makes PA-DPL well suited for partial 
dynamic reconfiguration, which makes it potentially to be 
used in reconfiguration based dynamic security protection.  
A trade-off is the shorter evaluation time which restricts 
the maximal speed. However, a bigger opportunity of logic 
optimization in PA-DPL helps to shorten the critical path. 
Further timing optimization and real time reconfiguration of 
the false core would be a part of the future work.  
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